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540 PEOPLE v. JACKSON [42 C.2d 
In Bank. Mar. 
'l'HE v. CHESTER JACKSON, 
Criminal Law-Instructions-Applicability to Facts.-It is 
error to charge jury on abstract principles of law not pertinent 
to issues in case since such an instruction tends to confuse and 
mislead jury by injecting into case matters which undisputed 
evidence shows are not involved. 
Id.-Instructions-Applicability to Facts.-If evidence dis-
closes facts pertinent to case and affecting substantial rights 
of a party the court must instruct jury with reference to 
applicable law when requested by either party (Pen. Code, 
§ 1093, sub d. ( 6)) and do so even though no request has 
been made. (Pen. Code, 1127.) 
[3] Id.-Defenses-Entrapment.-Under doctrine of entrapment, 
the overt aets essential to commission of crime are assumed 
to have been committed by defendant, but criminal intent, 
also essential to completion of crime, is not assumed to have 
been established and is assumed to be lacking when it did not 
originate in mind of' defendant but was conceived in minds 
of enforcement officers for unlawful purpose of inducing him 
to commit a crime. 
[ 4] ld.-Defenses-Entrapment.-Cooperation and encouragement 
on part of enforcement officers are not enough to establish 
entrapment; it is also necessary to show that intent to commit 
acts which might lead to a criminal prosecution was generated 
in minds of enforcement officers and not in mind of defendant. 
[5] Id.-Instructions-Entrapment.-An instruction that the law 
does not tolerate a person, particularly an enforcement officer, 
generating in mind of innocent person original intent to com-
mit a crime, thus entrapping him into commission of a crime 
which he would not have committed or even contemplated but 
for such inducement, and that defendant is not criminally 
liable for such crime if intent to commit it did not originate 
with him and he was not carrying out his own criminal pur-
pose, but crime was suggested by another person acting with 
purpose of entrapping and causing arrest of defendant, is a 
correct statement of law on subject and, when given on theory 
that jury might mistakenly consider conduct of officers as en-
[3] See Cal..Jur.2d, Criminal § 205 et seq.; Am.Jur., Criminal 
Law, § 335 et seq. 
McK. Dig. References: [1, 2] Criminal Law,§ 734; [3, 4] Crim-
inal Law, §50; [5, 7] Criminal Law, § 761; [6] Criminal Law, 
§ 1424; [8] Bribery, § 27. 
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trapment though criminal intent originated in mind of de-
fendant, is more favorable to defendant than he is entitled to. 
[6] Id.-Appeal-Harmless and Reversible Error-Instructions.-
Where instruction on entrapment is more favorable to de-
fendant than evidence justifies, he has no cause for com-
plaint. 
[7] Id.-Instructions-Entrapment.--An instruction that when law 
enforcement ofilcers are informed that a person intends to 
commit a crime the law permits officers to afford opportunity 
for commission of offense and to lend apparent cooperation of 
themselves or a third person for of detecting offender, 
and that when such a practice is peace officers, 
if the suspect himself, originally and of officers, 
intends to commit acts constituting a crime, and in pursuit 
of such intent he personally does every act necessary to con-
stitute a crime on his part, his guilt of crime thus committed 
by him is not affected by, and he has no defense in, the fact 
that when acts are done by him an officer or other person en-
gaged in detecting crime is present and provides opportunity 
or aids or encourages commission of offense, is a correct pro-
nouncement of the law and may properly be given where evi-
dence discloses pertinent facts. 
[8] Bribery-Instructions.-In prosecution for offering to give 
bribe to specified police officers with intent to influence them 
in connection with operation of gambling and bookmaking in 
city, it is not error to refuse an instruction tendered by de-
fendant as to his beliefs concerning payoffs in police depart-
ment as furnishing reasons for his proposals to police officers, 
where jury was admonished during trial that defendant's testi-
mony concerning reports and statements brought to his atten-
tion of existence of bookmaking and protection payoffs in 
police department were admitted for limited purpose of show-
ing his belief and that it was immaterial whether such reports 
were true or false if he believed them to be true . 
.APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Lo;:; 
Angeles County and from an order denying a new triaL 
Arnold Praeger, Judge. Affirmed. 
Prosecution for bribery. Judgment of conviction affirmed. 
Jerome \Veber, Ginsberg, '£heodore Flier and Jess 
Whitehill for Appellant. 
Edmund G. Attorney Norman H. 
Deputy Attorney General, S. Ernest Roll, District Attorney 
(Los Angeles), and Robert vYheeler, Deputy District Attorney, 
for Respondent. 
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SHENK, J-.-This is an from a judgment convicting 
the defendant of offering to bribe two police officers contrary 
to the provisions of section 67 of the Penal Code, and from 
an order denying a motion for a new trial. The bases for 
the appeal are errors in giving two instructions offered 
by the prosecution and in an instruction tendered 
by the defendant. 
The defendant had been a member of the Pasadena Police 
Department for seven years when he resigned in September, 
1951, to become a liquor salesman. During the four years 
prior to his he had been in the Detective Division 
in the Pawnshop Detail and had frequently worked special 
details with Officer Bornhoft of the Check and Forgery Detail. 
A close personal friendship existed between these men and 
their families. Also in the Detective Division was Officer 
Thomas, a personal friend of Bornhoft but whom the de-
fendant knew only slightly. None of these men had served 
on the vice squad of the Pasadena Police Department. On 
December 6, 1951, Thomas was appointed head of the vice 
squad. The former members resigned or were shifted to other 
assignments. 
On the evening of December 6, 1951, defendant contacted 
Bornhoft, who was then on vacation, at his home and asked 
him how Thomas would take his new job. Bornhoft replied 
he didn't know as Thomas was a peculiar person to figure 
out. Defendant then stated that he knew that neither of 
them believed in the more violent types of crime, such as 
burglary, robbery and homicide, but they both knew that 
gambling and bookmaking existed and would continue to 
exist in the community; that he had learned a lot about it 
he hadn't known while he was in the department; and that 
either Thomas would allow these things to go on or he would 
not remain in charge of the vice squad very long. He told 
Bornhoft that because of the latter's close friendship with 
Thomas he (defendant) and other people thought that Born-
haft would be the logical person to contact Thomas and see how 
he felt about allowing these things to continue. He intimated 
that if a meeting could be arranged there might be anywhere 
from $25 to $100 a week in it for Bornhoft. He suggested 
the following Tuesday for such a meeting. Bornhoft 
advised Thomas of this conversation the following day, Sun-
day, and on Monday when he returned to work he reported 
the conversation to his officer and to the chief of 
police. He and Thomas were advised by them to go along 
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with the defendant's proposal, to find out who were behind the 
whole thing. 
On December 11th they met as suggested by defendant, 
had dinner, and then, again at defendant's suggestion, they 
drove in his car to a cafe in Eagle Rock. Bornhoft opened 
the conversation by stating that Thomas knew why they 
were there and to get on with the business. Defendant re-
marked that he knew how they all felt about the more violent 
type of crimes, but that there had been payoffs to the police 
department in the past with regard to gambling and book-
making activities and there were some in the department 
at that time who felt the same way. He would not answer 
Thomas' query as to who these men were. He stated that 
he represented a group of people who wanted to get action 
(a movement of money in gambling) started, and that Thomas, 
as head of the vice squad, could make from $100 to $1,000 
a week by ''doing nothing.'' \Vhen Thomas asked what his 
duties would be he said that if any complaints came in about 
telephone places or spots (a place where bets are received 
by a bookmaking agent) Thomas was to call a certain phone 
number; that a place would have to operate 6 to 8 weeks 
in order to pay; and that thereafter if any complaints were 
received a raid could be arranged with "fall guys" (not 
the real operators) set up to stand arrest and undergo prose-
cution. Thomas would not give him a definite answer, saying 
that he had to know more of the details about the risks and 
reward involved and would have to know everyone who was 
in on the arrangements. He asked defendant what he knew 
about the Foothill Charter Club at 10 East Colorado Boule-
vard, and when defendant countered with the inquiry, "what 
did Thomas lmow," Thomas replied that he probably knew 
more about it than the defendant realized. Thomas testified 
at the trial that he told defendant how that place was set 
up and that the reward he would require for allowing such 
a place to operate would, in view of the risks involved, be 
$62,500. This sum he arrived at calculating the amount 
his salary would bring him for the next 10 years, at the 
end of which time he expected to retire. 
On December 17th defendant saw Bornhoft and inquired 
as to Thomas' reaction. Bornhoft advised he didn't know 
and that the defendant would have to ask Thomas. At de-
fendant's request a meeting was arranged for the following 
night, December 17th. Thomas insisted that Bornhoft also 
be present and informed defendant that before he would 
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Amvh·,+~ any further he would have to be sure that every-
Defendant told him that 
of Santa .Anita, 
; that it concerned the opening 
at various around the city, 
for which Thomas would receive $300 a week, 
and if these well or other operations were opened up, 
he would receive more. No further duties were required of 
Bornhoft but he was to receive a weekly sum for his share in 
arranging the meetings with Thomas. Defendant told Thomas 
that he didn't know if he could get all the persons involved 
together for a meeting as 'l'homas had demanded, but he 
would try. No further contact was made by defendant with 
either Bornhoft or Thomas. Several months later an infor-
mation was filed against the defendant charging him with 
offering a bribe to Officers Bornhoft and Thomas with the 
corrupt intent to influence them as police officers. He was 
subsequently tried before a jury and convicted. .A motion 
for new trial was denied. The defendant was sentenced to 
state prison for the term prescribed by law, but execution of 
sentence was suspended and he was granted probation on 
condition that he serve nine months of the probationary period 
in the county jail. 
At the trial defendant admitted that he had initiated the 
meetings with Bornhoft and Thomas and had proposed the 
payoff scheme to them, but he denied that he had any corrupt 
intent in so doing. His defense was that the proposal was 
a fictitious one, designed to test the honesty of the officers 
involved as a part of his plan to apprehend one Wiseman, 
a bookmaker in Pasadena who he believed was the head of 
the bookmaking ring there. \Viseman had been a member 
of the vice squad when 'one Clint Wright was in charge of 
it, prior to Thomas' appointment. Defendant testified that 
he believed that certain members of the vice squad had been 
accepting payoffs for protecting gambling and bookmaking 
in Pasadena and that he had determined that if he could 
prove to himself that the new head of the vice squad, Thomas, 
was honest he would enlist his aid in apprehending Wiseman 
and the members of the department who he believed 
had been accepting payoffs. He contended that there was 
no one behind that he was not representing any persons 
or interests, and that the fictitious proposal was entirely his 
own idea, made for the altruistic purpose of civic betterment. 
The·defendant attempted to show at the trial that his state 
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of mind in this matter was influenced various considera-
while visit-
"d"U"'4"' both with 
with 
Wiseman's activities; his observations of persons 
making and receiving and his conversations with Wise-
man himself. He also attempted to as further grounds 
for his belief that some members of the department 
could not be trusted : that valuable properties were owned 
by certain members of the department which were out of pro-
portion to their salaries; that reports had been made 
to the vice squad concerning gambling with apparently no 
official action taken; that the sheriff's office was called in to 
participate in raids on gambling establishments within the 
city limits; and that soon after certain raids had taken place 
the former members of the vice squad had been shifted and 
Thomas had been appointed as head of the new vice squad. 
This evidence was admitted by the court for the limited 
purpose of showing the intent of the defendant and the reasons 
for his asserted activities. 
The court admonished the jury as follows: "Now, ladies 
and gentlemen of the jury, I should explain this to you: that 
in admitting evidence of this character, it only goes to the 
question of the state of mind or the intent of the defendant, 
and goes to his reasons for his state of mind or his intent 
at that time. It doesn't establish the truth or falsity of the 
conversations which he will relate, and it is not necessary, 
either, for him to prove their truth nor for the People to 
prove the untruthfulness of them." And, "Now, I should 
state to the jury that a person may testify directly as to 
his intention. In other words, as to why he did a certain 
thing, and that is direct evidence. Witnesses may also testify 
as to the basis upon which they formed their intention and 
upon which the witness acted. It does not prove-the testi-
mony of the reason, or relating to the reason that the witness 
gives for the forming of his intention, or why he acted, does 
not prove either the truth or falsity of the reasons which 
he gives, and you must weigh those matters in the light of 
the testimony that you hear from this stand." 
The defendant especially complains of two instructions 
given at the request of the prosecution on the subject of 
entrapment and asserts that they relate to rules of law not 
applicable to the case. He contends that these instructions 
42 C.2d-18 
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tended to confuse the minds of the as to the issues 
and the evidence, and that they resulted in error. 
The instructions are as follows : 
"No. 851. The law does not tolerate a person, particularly 
a law enforcement officer, generating in the mind of a person 
who is innocent of any criminal purpose, the original intent 
to commit a crime thus entrapping such person into the 
commission of a crime which he would not have committed 
or even contemplated but for such inducement; and where 
a crime is committed as a consequence of such entrapment, 
no conviction may be had of the person so entrapped as his 
acts do not constitute a crime. 
''If the intent to commit the crime did not originate with 
the defendant and he was not carrying out his own criminal 
purpose, but the crime was suggested by another person acting 
with the purpose of entrapping and causing the arrest of 
the defendant, then the defendant is not criminally liable 
for the acts so committed.'' 
"No. 852. When law enforcement officers are informed 
that a person intends to commit a crime, the law, in the 
interests of law enforcement and the suppression of crime, 
permits the officers to afford opportunity for the commission 
of the offense, and to lend the apparent cooperation of them-
selves or of a third person for the purpose of detecting the 
offender. When such a practice is followed by peace officers, 
if the suspect himself, originally and independently of the 
officers, intends to commit the acts constituting a crime, and 
if in pursuit of such intent he personally does every act 
necessary to constitute a crime on his part, his guilt of the 
crime thus committed by him is not affected by, and he has 
no defense in, the fact that when the acts are done by him 
an officer or other person engaged in detecting crime is present 
and provides the opportunity, or aids or encourages the com-
mission of the offense.'' 
Under the provisions of section 1093, subdivision 6, of the 
Penal Code the duty is laid on the to charge the jury ''on 
any points of law pertinent to the issue, if requested by either 
party'' ; and section 1127 of the same code, as amended in 
1935, provides that ''In charging the jury the court may 
instruct the jury regarding the law applicable to the facts 
of the case ... " [1] It has long been the law that it is 
error to charge the jury on abstract principles of law not 
pertinent to the issues in the case. (People v. Roe (1922), 
189 Cal. 548, 558 [209 P. 560] .) The reason for the rule 
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is obvious. Such an instruction tends to confuse and mislead 
the jury by injecting into the case matters which the undis-
puted evidence shows are not involved. But if the 
evidence discloses facts pertinent to the case and affecting 
the substantial rights of a party the court, as above indicated, 
must instruct the with reference to the applicable law 
when requested by either party and may do so even though 
no request l1as been made. 
The question then is : '\Vas there evidence in the case 
which would justify tl1e court in giving the instructions 
complained of~ 
[3] Under the doctrine of entrapment, the overt acts 
essential to the commission of the offense charged are assumed 
to have been committed by the defendant. But the criminal 
intent, as here also essential to the completion of the crime, 
is not assumed to have been established. It is assumed to be 
lacking when it did not originate in the mind of the defendant 
but was conceived in the minds of the enforcement officers 
for the unlawful purpose of inducing him to commit a crime. 
Here the evidenee as to the overt acts committed by the de-
fendant is undisputed. In fact he admitted the commission 
of them. He also admitted an intention to perform them 
but sought to avoid any criminal responsibility flowing there-
from by claiming that his intention was to test the honesty 
and integrity of the incoming head of the vice squad by 
submitting to him a plan for police protection and discover 
whether he would or would not agree to it. The question of 
criminal intention was the only issue at the trial. 
The record discloses a factual situation which the 
attorney general in his brief calls a "coloration of entrap-
ment.'' Without an instruction on the subject the jury 
might have applied to the evidence of cooperation and en-
couragement on the part of the officers a layman's conception 
of what constitutes entrapment. With this condition of the 
evidence the prosecution and the trial court deemed it ad-
visable to instruct the jury on the essentials of entrapment 
which when shown to be present would absolve the defendant 
of any criminal responsibility; but under the Jaw that co-
operation and encouragement on the part of the officers were 
not enough. It was also necessary to show that the intent 
to commit the acts which might lead to a criminal prosecution 
was generated in the minds of the enforcement officers and 
not in the mind of the defendant. 
548 PEOPLE v. JACKSON [42 C.2d 
Instruction No. 851 on entrapment is a correct state-
of the law on the subject. It was no doubt given on 
that under the admitted facts the might mis-
consider the conduct of the officers as entrapment 
even the criminal intent originated in the mind of 
the defendant. Viewed in that light the instruction was more 
favorable to the defendant than he was entitled to. If the 
had returned a verdict of not on the theory of 
that instruction the could have no cause to com-
for the reason that it had itself offered the instruction. 
And more favorable to the defendant than the 
evidence justified he has no just cause for complaint. (James 
v. E. G. Lyons Co., 147 Cal. 69, 76 [81 P. 275] ; People v. 
Lanzit, 70 Cal.App. 498, 513 [233 P. 816].) Thus instruction 
No. 851 cannot be said to have misled the jury as to the 
main issue in the case, namely, whether the defendant had 
first conceived the intent to commit bribery; nor to have con-
stituted an instruction that the jury was to assume that 
the original intent was first generated in the mind of the 
defendant. (See People v. Chessman, 38 Cal.2d 166, 182-183 
[238 P.2d 1001].) 
[7] Instruction No. 852 is also a correct pronouncement 
of the law and its application fits precisely into the facts of 
this case. There can be no question but that the evidence is 
sufficient to support the implied finding of the jury that the 
intention to commit the crime originated in the mind of the 
defendant and that the conduct of the police officers was 
within the rule of apparent cooperation which the law permits 
in the detection and prosecution of crime. The jury was not 
required to accept as true the defendant's alleged altruistic 
attitude and rather fantastic claim that his motive in thus 
planning police protection for gambling operations was to 
test the integrity of the incoming head of the vice squad 
of the police department. There was no error in giving 
either and both of these instructions. 
[8] The defendant also complains of the refusal of the 
court to an instruction tendered by him as to his beliefs 
concerning in the police department as furnishing 
reasons for his proposals to the police officers. As above 
the was ailmonished the trial that the 
defendant's reports and statements 
to his attention as to the existence of bookmaking 
and protection payoffs in the police department were admitted 
for the limited purpose of showing his belief and that it 
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was immaterial whether such were true or false if 
he believed them to be true. These admonitions ;,wtw.ou:oH 
eovered the subject matter of the refused instruction. A 
review of the instructions as whole demonstrates that the 
jury was and advised as to the of proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant in the first 
instance had a specific intent wilfully, knowingly and cor-
ruptly to influence the officers in question in the performance 
of their official duties. He was ably represented by counsel 
and had a full and fair trial free from error. 
The judgment and order are affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Edmonds, J., Traynor, J., and Spence, J., 
concurred. 
CARTER, J.-I concur in the conclusion that the judgment 
and order denying defendant a new trial must be affirmed. 
I do not agree, however, that there is any evidence in the 
record which would support an instruction on entrapment. 
In the majority opinion it is admitted that " [ t]he question 
of criminal intention was the only issue at the trial." 
The jury was adequately instructed on the intent necessary 
to constitute the crime, and under the facts presented it is 
to be presumed that it found that defendant did possess that 
intent. 
While I feel that there was no evidence to support the 
instructions given on entrapment, I do not feel that under 
the evidence presented the instructions could have confused 
the jury so as to result in any prejudice to defendant. For 
that reason, I concur in the judgment. 
Schauer, J., concurred. 
